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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PARTS.COM, LLC,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 13-CV-1078 JLS (WMc)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
(ECF No. 11)
vs.
YAHOO! INC.,
Defendant.
Presently before the court is Defendant Yahoo! Inc.’s (“Defendant,” or “Yahoo”)
Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) Plaintiff Parts.com, LLC’s (“Plaintiff,” or “Parts.com”)
Complaint.  (ECF No. 11.)  Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s Response in
Opposition to (ECF No. 14) and Defendant’s Reply in Support of (ECF No. 15) the
Motion.  The hearing set for the motion on September 26, 2013 was vacated, and the
matter taken under submission on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil
Local Rule 7.1.d.1.  (ECF No. 16.)  Having considered the parties’ arguments and the
law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s MTD.
BACKGROUND
Parts.com is an online retailer of automotive parts that has been in operation since
January 2002.  (Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1.)  Parts.com lists and sells automotive parts
using the trademark “Parts.com.”  (Id.)  The Parts.com mark was registered on
September 16, 2008, to Intelligentz Corporation, which subsequently assigned the mark
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to Parts.com on February 24, 2012.  (Id. ¶ 7.)  Parts.com describes itself as the “source
of over 20 million automotive replacement parts, accessories, catalogues and related
automotive materials and equipment for over 40 automobile manufacturers worldwide.” 
(Id.)
Yahoo is an interactive Internet search engine provider.  (Id. ¶ 9.)  As part of this
business, Yahoo sells keyword triggers—search terms that trigger the display of
“sponsored links”—to businesses wishing to advertise on Yahoo’s search engine.  (Id.
¶ 11.)  Yahoo displays sponsored links alongside “organic results”—links that are a
result of Yahoo’s search engine algorithm rather than the payment of an advertising
premium.  (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.)  The search query “parts.com” on Yahoo’s search engine
yields a lengthy list of links.  (Id., Ex. C.)  However, only two or three of these links
actually display the “parts.com” mark in their link text.1  (Id., Ex. C.)  
Plaintiff alleges that this use of the parts.com mark creates consumer confusion
regarding the relationship between Yahoo, Parts.com, and the various businesses that
have purchased the “parts.com” keyword trigger to advertise their goods and services. 
(Id. ¶¶ 20–23.)  As a result, Plaintiff asserts the following six claims against Yahoo: (1)
federal trademark infringement, (2) federal false designation of origin and unfair
competition, (3) state trademark infringement and unfair competition, (4) state unfair
and deceptive trade practices, (5) federal trademark dilution, and (6) state trademark
dilution and injury to business reputation.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the
defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”
generally referred to as a motion to dismiss.  The Court evaluates whether a complaint
states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil
1 There are two links labeled “Parts.com” that seemingly redirect to another page of Yahoo
results, while the total number of links with “Parts.com” in them increases to three if one counts
another link for “CarParts.com.” 
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Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).  In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).  “Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  A claim is
facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).  That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Id.  Facts
“‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to
relief.  Id.  (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).  Further, the Court need not accept as
true “legal conclusions” contained in the complaint.  Id.  This review requires context-
specific analysis involving the Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at
679 (citation omitted).  “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”  Id.
Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless
the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged
pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’”  DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,
957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
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Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).  In other words, where leave to
amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. 
DISCUSSION
I. Claim 1: Federal Trademark Infringement
To state a claim for federal trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, a
plaintiff “‘must prove: (1) that it has a protectible ownership interest in the mark; and
(2) that the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.’” 
Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d
1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006)).  The use of a trademark as a search engine keyword
triggering the display of a competitor’s advertisement is a “use in commerce” that
activates the Lanham Act’s protections.  Id. at 1144–45.  
As to the first element, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied its burden by
demonstrating a valid ownership interest in the Parts.com mark.  Parts.com is a
federally registered trademark and, as such, is entitled to a presumption of validity.  See
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a); see also Compl., Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1.  Moreover, Plaintiff has
satisfactorily alleged ownership of the Parts.com mark.  (See Compl., Ex. B, ECF No.
1-1.) 
As to the second element, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient
likelihood of confusion to survive Defendant’s MTD.  When evaluating this element
on a motion to dismiss, “[i]f the court determines as a matter of law from the pleadings
that the goods are unrelated and confusion is unlikely, the complaint should be
dismissed.”  Murray v. Cable Nat’l Broad. Co., 86 F.3d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
Toho Co. Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1981)).  But,
while likelihood of confusion can be decided as a matter of law, “[w]hether confusion
is likely is a factual determination woven into the law” that courts “routinely treat . . .
as [an issue] of fact.”  Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1985).
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Defendant’s chief argument for dismissal is that the Complaint is too conclusory
to state a plausible claim for relief.  (MTD 8, ECF No. 11-1.)  In support, Defendant
notes that much of the language of the Complaint is seemingly “cribbed”—i.e., copied
and pasted en masse—from other complaints.2  (Id. at 10–15.)  But while Defendant’s
frustration with the Complaint is understandable, evidence of cribbing alone does not
warrant dismissal; rather, it merely bolsters an argument that a complaint’s allegations
are “without factual basis.”  See Grimes v. Fremont Gen. Corp., No. 08-CV-1024
(KMK), 2013 WL 1187474, at *8–10, n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2013).
Despite the cribbing, Exhibit C to the Complaint establishes that Plaintiff’s
federal trademark infringement claim is sufficiently pleaded.  Defendant claims that
nothing in Exhibit C shows “any sponsored links ‘bearing the title Parts.com.’” (MTD
8–9, ECF No. 11-1.)  This, however, is incorrect.  Exhibit C does show two or three
links displayed as “parts.com,” although it appears that two of these results redirect to
other pages of Yahoo results and are not to independent websites.  (See Compl. Ex. C,
ECF No. 1-1; see also note 1, supra.)  Whether the use of the mark “parts.com” as a
redirect to “more sponsors” and the display of “CarParts.com” as a search result
presents a likelihood of confusion for consumers is a question of fact best resolved at
a later stage in this litigation.  See Levi Strauss, 778 F.2d at 1356. 
Defendant argues that Network Automation somehow disposes of this issue as a
matter of law.  (MTD 13–15, ECF No. 11-1.)  In Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit
stated that, “[w]hile the statement [that Internet users exercise a low degree of care
when shopping online] may have been accurate [a decade ago], we suspect that there
are many contexts in which it no longer holds true.”  638 F.3d at 1144, 1153–54. 
Network Automation, however, is distinguishable, as its procedural posture does not
justify a finding of no likelihood of confusion at the dismissal stage, as here.  In
2Plaintiff has since admitted to copying portions of the Complaint from other lawsuits’ filings
for the sake of “describ[ing] the ways in which Yahoo commits trademark infringement.”  (Opp’n 4–5,
ECF No. 14.)  
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Network Automation the Ninth Circuit found that the lower court improperly concluded
that the defendant was likely to succeed on the issue of likelihood of confusion.  See id.
at 1144, 1154.  On remand, however, this did not preclude the lower court from
ultimately finding a likelihood of confusion.  But even if Network Automation’s analysis
of consumer sophistication were binding on this Court, consumer sophistication is but
one of eight non-exhaustive factors for determining likelihood of confusion.  See id. at
1149, 1152–53.  Thus, Network Automation does not bar this Court’s decision that
Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded likelihood of confusion.3  Accordingly, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has satisfactorily alleged a federal trademark infringement claim and
DENIES Defendant’s MTD as to that claim.  
II. Claim 2: Federal False Designation of Origin and Unfair Competition
Pursuant to the Lanham Act,
any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).  The Supreme Court has defined “origin of goods” as the
“producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace.”  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003).  The Eastern District of California has
held that sponsored links offered by search engine services do not present a false
3As an ancillary point, Defendant also argues that Network Automation “raised the bar” for
stating a claim of federal trademark infringement by allegedly requiring proof of “likely confusion,
not mere diversion.”  (MTD 14, ECF No. 11-1 (citing 638 F.3d at 1149).)  Yet, the court in Network
Automation merely used the confusion/diversion distinction as a way of rebuking the lower court’s
use of the Internet “troika,” or an infringement analysis focusing only on three of the eight likelihood
of confusion factors when the alleged infringement takes place on the Internet.  638 F.3d at 1149. 
Thus, the “mere diversion” statement was intended to reemphasize the full set of factors for the
likelihood of confusion analysis. Even if Network Automation “raised the bar,” however, Plaintiff does
allege—albeit fleetingly—that consumer confusion exists.  (Compl.¶ 18, ECF No. 1.)  Moreover,
Exhibit C provides support for that allegation given the display of the term “Parts.com” two to three
times on the results page.  Thus, Plaintiff’s claim would still be sufficiently pleaded if Network
Automation somehow raised the pleading standard for a claim of federal trademark infringement. 
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designation of origin because consumers would not believe that a search engine service
such as Google “in [any] way directly represented that it is the producer of [plaintiff’s
trademarked] product.”  Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1121–22 (E.D. Cal.
2010). 
This Court finds the case at bar to be highly analogous to Jurin.  Like Google in
Jurin, Yahoo is a search engine provider that has never claimed to be the producer or
provider of Parts.com goods or services.  Yahoo only provides links in response to a
user’s query “Parts.com.”  Plaintiff concedes that “Yahoo may not be the ultimate
source of automotive parts and accessories,” but argues nonetheless that “Yahoo’s
confusing use of the mark parts.com as a keyword trigger suggests Yahoo is associated
or affiliated with” the producer of the parts and accessories.  (Opp’n 12, ECF No. 14.) 
Jurin, however, rejected this argument:
To the extent Plaintiff may contend that Defendant [Google] has helped
“facilitate” confusion of the product with others, such is a highly
attenuated argument.  Even if . . . a “Sponsored link” might confuse a
consumer, it is hardly likely that with several different sponsored links
appearing on a page that a consumer might believe each one is the true
producer or “origin” of the . . . product.  
Id.  Thus, the mere fact that Yahoo displays an array of links when a user enters
“Parts.com” as a search term is not enough to suggest that Yahoo is affiliated with
Parts.com.  Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s MTD as to the federal false
designation of origin claim, and this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
III. State Law Claims 3, 4, and 6: Trademark Infringement, Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices, and Trademark Dilution
Defendant’s broadest and most comprehensive argument for dismissal of
Plaintiff’s three state law claims is premised on the immunity conferred by § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).  The CDA provides a limited form of
immunity to certain Internet related entities: “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  The CDA
defines an “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible,
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in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service.”  Id. § 230(f)(3).  The CDA defines
an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server.”  Id. § 230(f)(2).
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the CDA’s immunity for interactive computer
services broadly, holding that the CDA bars state law intellectual property claims. 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Evans v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C 13-02477 WHA, 2013 WL 5594717, at *2 (N.D. Cal Oct.
10, 2013)  (citing Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118) (“Section 230 of the CDA bars state law
claims against internet service providers based on content provided by a third party.”); 
Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (“The CDA provides complete immunity to any provider
or user of an interactive computer service from liability premised on information
provided by another content provider.”).  Courts have held a wide array of state law
claims to fall within the CDA’s immunity if they “are predicated on the same conduct
as [the] state law intellectual property claims: the conduct of the content providers.” 
Evans, 2013 WL 5594717, at *2 (unfair competition, trademark law, right of publicity,
emotional distress); Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (negligent and intentional
interference with contractual relations, fraud, unjust enrichment).  
Yahoo argues that it qualifies as an “interactive computer service” without also
being an “information content provider,” because it acts purely as a seller of advertising
space while advertisers provide the content.  (MTD 23–24, ECF No. 11-1.)  Plaintiff
argues that Yahoo partially participates in the creation of advertising content and is
therefore an “information content provider.”  (Opp’n 17, ECF No. 14.)  However, as
Defendant has correctly pointed out, Plaintiff alleges no facts in its Complaint to
support the allegations in its Opposition that Defendant contributes to sponsored link
content.  At the dismissal stage, a court can only evaluate the complaint, any exhibits
attached to it, and matters of public record.  Jappa v. California, No. 08cv1813 WQH
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(PQR), 2009 WL 69312, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2009) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
Without anything in the Complaint to suggest that Yahoo creates advertisement
content, the Court is left with a portrait of Yahoo analogous to Google in Jurin.  Jurin
involved Google’s sales of keywords for the display of sponsored links in search engine
results—a business model almost identical to Yahoo’s.  695 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.  Like
Google, Yahoo “provides a space and a service and thereafter charges for its service,”
which “allows competitors to post their digital fliers where they might be most readily
received in the cyber-marketplace.”  Id.   The court in Jurin concluded that this activity
was entitled to CDA immunity.  Id.  Yahoo, therefore, should also be entitled to CDA
immunity for its advertising activities.  Thus, Plaintiff’s state law claims must fail.  See
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118; Evans, 2013 WL 5594717, at *2; Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d
at 1123.   Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s MTD with regard to Plaintiff’s
state law trademark infringement, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and trademark
dilution claims.4  Further, because these claims are barred by the CDA, amendment
would be futile, and therefore Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.  See Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658. 
IV. Claim 5: Federal Trademark Dilution
A successful claim for federal trademark dilution requires that a plaintiff prove
that: (1) it owns a famous trademark; (2) the famous mark is distinctive; (3) the
defendant is using or has used in commerce an identical or nearly identical trademark;
(4) the defendant began using the mark after the mark became famous; and (5) the
defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause dilution by blurring or tarnishment.  Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., No. C 07-03752 JSW, 2009 WL
1082175, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Jada Toys, Inc.
v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2007)), rev’d on other grounds 633 F.3d
4Because the Court finds Defendant’s CDA argument to be persuasive, the Court declines to
address Defendant’s other arguments for dismissal of the state law claims. 
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1158 (9th Cir. 2011).   
A. Fame of the Mark
A viable claim for federal trademark dilution requires that the mark be famous
at the time the defendant begins using it.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).  “A mark is famous
if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”  Id. §
1125(c)(2)(A).  In determining whether a mark is famous, a court may consider “all
relevant factors,” including: (1) “[t]he duration, extent, and geographic reach of
advertising and publicity of the mark”; (2) “[t]he amount, volume, and geographic
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark”; (3) “[t]he extent of actual
recognition of the mark”; and (4) whether the mark is registered.  Id. §
1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv).  The Court notes preliminarily that the Parts.com mark is
federally registered, and thus factor 4 weighs in favor of a finding of fame.  The Court
analyzes each of the remaining factors below.
i. Factor 1: Duration, Extent, and Geographic Reach of Advertising and Publicity
Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that “since at least January, 2000 . . . Parts.com
has expended a significant amount of resources in developing goodwill and brand
recognition in and for the parts.com® mark.”  (Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1.)  Plaintiff
alleges that it is the source of “over 20 million automotive replacement parts,
accessories, and related automotive materials and equipment for over 40 automobile
manufacturers worldwide.”  (Id. ¶ 7.)  Parts.com also has allegedly promoted its mark
“throughout the United States.”  (Id. ¶ 54.)  Defendant argues that these allegations of
nationwide fame and promotion are conclusory and therefore not “plausible” under
Twombly and Iqbal.  (MTD 7–10, ECF No. 11-1.)  The Court agrees with Defendant.
Plaintiff’s allegations concerning promotion of the mark are largely conclusory. 
There are no specific allegations of online promotions, advertising campaigns, or
presence in trade publications.  There are no factual allegations beyond the bare bones
assertion that Plaintiff has “expended a significant amount of resources” to “promote[]
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. . . [the] mark throughout the United States.”  (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 54, ECF No. 1.)  Although
Plaintiff does allege the duration of its promotion of the mark, this alone cannot make
up for the lack of facts regarding the extent and geographic reach of this promotion.
Although we “accept[] these allegations as true,” as urged by Plaintiff (Opp’n 14, ECF
No. 14), these conclusory allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Twombly and Iqbal
pleading standard.  Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of Yahoo.
ii. Factor 2: Amount, Volume, and Geographic Extent of Sales
Plaintiff alleges that “Parts.com is the online source of over 20 million
automotive replacement parts, accessories, and related automotive materials and
equipment for over 40 automobile manufacturers worldwide.”  (Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No.
1.)  This is the only statement in the Complaint that comes close to addressing the
amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales.  This statement, however, alleges
nothing regarding sales—rather, it seems to refer to inventory.  Although Plaintiff may
be the source of an impressive “20 million automotive replacement parts,” Plaintiff does
not say how many parts it sells in any given fiscal year, what its annual sales revenue
is, or where those sales are made.  Having 20 million products available and being
willing to ship them worldwide does not necessarily correlate to a successful global
business.  Thus, without more concrete factual allegations relating to sales, this factor
weighs in favor of Yahoo.
iii. Factor 3: Extent of Actual Recognition
Plaintiff has alleged nothing in its Complaint suggesting that the general
consuming public recognizes the Parts.com mark.  Plaintiff alleges that it has spent
money “developing goodwill and brand recognition,” but this does not necessarily mean
that Plaintiff’s efforts were successful.  (Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1.)  Even if the Court
were to accept that Plaintiff’s development efforts imply success, the Complaint is
devoid of any allegations regarding the extent of that recognition.  Instead,  in its claim
for federal dilution, Plaintiff simply alleges that because of its “exclusive[] and
continuous[] promot[ion]” of its mark “throughout the United States,” the mark “has
- 11 - 13cv1078
Case 3:13-cv-01078-JLS-WMC   Document 18   Filed 12/04/13   Page 11 of 12
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
become a famous and well-known symbol of Parts.com.”  (Id. at ¶ 54.)  Although a
household-name brand like Coca-Cola likely could simply allege that it is “famous and
well-known,” Parts.com does not have this kind of consumer cachet.  Thus, without
more detailed factual allegations regarding actual recognition, this factor favors Yahoo.
iv. Balancing     
Three of the four factors relevant to determining a mark’s fame favor Defendant. 
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding these three factors are conclusory and do not provide
sufficient specific facts to be plausible.  Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish the fame of its
mark, an essential element to a federal trademark dilution claim.  Accordingly, the
Court GRANTS Defendant’s MTD with regard to Plaintiff’s federal trademark dilution
claim.  This claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.5  
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Yahoo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as to
Claims 2 through 6.  Claims  3, 4, and 6 are preempted and are therefore DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.  Claims 2 and 5 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
The Court DENIES Yahoo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Claim 1.
If Plaintiff wishes, it SHALL FILE an amended complaint within fourteen days
of the date on which this Order is electronically docketed.  Failure to file an amended
complaint by this date may result in dismissal of this case with prejudice.
DATED:  December 4, 2013
Honorable Janis L. Sammartino
United States District Judge
5 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is deficient on the threshold issue of fame
of the mark, the Court declines to address Defendant’s other defenses to the federal dilution claim.  
- 12 - 13cv1078
Case 3:13-cv-01078-JLS-WMC   Document 18   Filed 12/04/13   Page 12 of 12
